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Abstract
This paper presents a case study of large- and small-scale irrigators negotiating for access to water from Nduruma River in
the Pangani River Basin, Tanzania. The paper shows that despite the existence of a formal statutory water permit system,
all users need to conform to the existing local rules in order to secure access to water. The spatial geography of Nduruma is
such that smallholder farmers are located upstream and downstream, while large-scale irrigators are in the midstream part
of the sub-catchment. There is not enough water in the river to satisfy all demands. The majority of the smallholder farmers
currently access water under local arrangements, but large-scale irrigators have obtained state-issued water use permits.
To access water the estates adopt a variety of strategies: they try to claim water access by adhering to state water law; they
engage with the downstream smallholder farmers and negotiate rotational allocation; and/or they band with downstream
farmers to secure more water from upstream farmers. Estates that were successful in securing their water access were those
that engaged with the local system and negotiated a fair rotational water-sharing arrangement. By adopting this strategy,
the estates not only avoid conflict with the poor downstream farmers but also gain social reputation, increasing chances of
cooperative behaviours from the farmers towards their hydraulic infrastructure investments. Cooperative behaviours by the
estates may also be due to their dependence on local labour. We further find diverging perspectives on the implementation
of the state water use permits – not only between the local and state forms of water governance, but also between the differing administrative levels of government. The local governments are more likely to spend their limited resources on ‘keeping
the peace’ rather than on enforcing the water law. At the larger catchment scale, however, the anonymity between users
makes it more difficult to initiate and maintain cooperative arrangements.

Keywords: water rights, legitimacy, conflict, subsistence irrigated agriculture, Tanzania

Introduction
Increased water scarcity leads to competition between water
users, large and small, up- and downstream. Conflict may arise
because upstream users abstract most of the water and leave
their downstream neighbours with scarcity. To solve water
allocation conflicts, many governments attempt to formalise
the water rights system – users are granted rights to use a
certain amount of water, at a particular location and duration.
However, the formalisation of water rights may also provide
opportunities for wealthier, more powerful, and better-connected users to manipulate registration to serve their own interests (Bruns, 2007). In addition, since sources of water rights
are multiple and often conflicting, formalisation may lead to
struggles over whose water right is legitimate. Smallholder
farmers may base their water claims on customary rights and
their historical investments in water infrastructure, while new
users (e.g. large-scale irrigators and cities) use state-issued
water rights to gain control of water sources.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the CTA annual
seminar – Closing the Knowledge Gap: Integrated Water
Management for Sustainable Agriculture. Johannesburg, South
Africa, 22-26 November 2010.
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This paper presents the struggles for water access and control in Nduruma River, upper Pangani River Basin, Tanzania.
The present water rights system in Tanzania builds on water
law established by the colonial authorities in the early 20th
century – a law specifically designed to limit use among native
inhabitants while at the same time securing access to water
for European settlers (Lein and Tagseth, 2009). In addition
to the colonial-induced water access asymmetry, more recent
increased water demand has led to fierce competition in the
Nduruma sub-catchment. This increasing water demand is
partly caused by the revitalization of coffee estates by both
local and international private capital. Several of these estates
are relics of the German and British colonisers (cf. Spear,
1997). Most of the coffee estates have been converted into large
flower farms by a new group of white farmers, making the
present social-geography a mirror image of the colonial past.
The area which was once called the ‘iron ring of alienated land’
(Spear, 1997), is called today the ‘plastic valley’ because of its
numerous greenhouses. Old estates were also the centre of the
protracted struggles over water and land resources between the
local people (Meru and Arusha), white settlers, and the colonial administration (Spear, 1997). Just as in the colonial time,
present-day water users relying on Nduruma River must operate in a plural legal context that is made up of locally-evolved
water-sharing practices and the water rights system crafted by
the national government.
This paper illustrates how new commercial estate owners
(mostly international companies) in this sub-catchment must
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adapt to local concepts of legitimate water rights to survive.
They must accept the fact that acquiring state water rights does
not automatically translate into legitimacy at the local level.
To understand the dynamic of the struggles for water rights
in the sub-catchment we develop a conceptual framework
based on Boelens echelons of water rights analysis (Boelens,
2008; Zwarteveen et al., 2005) and the concept of legitimacy
(Bodansky, 1999; 2007).
It is important at this point to clarify our use and preference for the terminology of institutions – informal, formal,
customary, modern, indigenous, local, bureaucratic and stateled. Similarly to Komakech et al. (2011), we use the term local
to mean farmer-initiated water allocation rules that evolved
over time. We prefer the term ‘local’ over the commonly used
‘informal’, because access and use of irrigation canals is often
strongly regulated and enforced and combines both customary
and modern elements. Similarly, we use ‘statutory’ to signify
government-sanctioned water management rules. We put
particular emphasis on the origin of the rules instead of stating
their perceived false formality or modernity (see Komakech
et al., 2011). Formal rules may also have informal origins and
calling them modern wrongly suggests that they are better than
traditional institutions.
The paper is organised as follows: The conceptual framework used to explore water rights struggles in the Nduruma
sub-catchment is followed by a description of the case study
catchment. The water governance context in the Nduruma subcatchment is discussed, after which cases of rights struggles
and negotiation processes are presented, focusing on the role
of large-scale irrigators in local water allocation systems. This
is followed by a discussion of the research findings in light of
water rights theory and formalisation. Finally, by way of conclusion, some lessons for the development of catchment water
allocation systems are provided.

Framework: water rights, struggles and control
Property rights define an individual’s rights, privileges and
associated limitations of a specific resource use; allocation of
property rights affects the efficiency of resource use (Schlager
and Ostrom, 1992). According to Bromley (1997), property
provides some benefit streams, while a right to property offers
security over that benefit stream. A property right defines a
relationship between individuals (or groups) with respect to the
use of a particular resource and the benefits this use generates.
To have a property right is to have the capacity to require some
authority system to defend your interest against the interests
of others (Bromley, 1997: 50). Because of its vital, rivalry and
non-excludability characteristics, water is a unique resource,
the management of which requires a suitable set of institutional
arrangements. A water right is therefore often composed of a
set or ‘bundle’ of graduated privileges that are assigned to different social entities (Bruns, 2007; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992;
Shi, 2006). This defines who is entitled to a certain amount of
water, at a particular time and location, during scarcity.
The sources of water rights are multiple and dynamic. They
often take many forms at many levels of water management.
Water allocation is not necessarily a matter of formal licences
to abstract water or contractual commitments for water delivery, but also local understandings such as taking turns to
use water, and when and where irrigation water may be used
(Bruns, 2007). According to Bruns (2007), real access to water
depends on how water is allocated at multiple levels, among
larger jurisdictions such as nations, states, provinces, and
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districts and among organisations and individuals extracting
water from rivers and aquifers, as well as on the crucial details
of water distribution within irrigation systems. Water rights
may be implicit in the design of structures, and asserted in
decisions about guarding, maintaining, or modifying irrigation
infrastructure (Bruns, 2007; Lankford and Beale, 2007). Even
when water rights are formally stipulated, such entitlements
must still be translated into seasonal and daily decisions about
withdrawing water.
With increasing water scarcity, most governments find
themselves walking a tight line. To create, maintain or restore
order, governments assert full ownership of water, and, in
theory, also the sole authority to determine who is entitled to
water at a particular point in time (Bruns and Meinzen-Dick,
2001; Molle, 2004). Water users (individual or groups) are
granted ‘official’ licences or permits to use a certain amount
of water, at a particular location and duration. Domestic users
may be granted access to water (mainly for drinking) without a
permit. The duration of rights may be permanent, for a number
of years, or made conditional upon productive use, but does
not usually take into account hydrological variability (Molle,
2004). Common belief is that the state’s prescriptive water right
is legitimate and legal. However, alongside the statutory rights
system are local norms and customs that mediate day-to-day
access to water.
By contrast, local water rights (based on customs and
norms), are locally developed and adapted through step-by-step
negotiation between the users – often building on a pre-existing
rights system. As described by Molle (2004), the process of
negotiation occurs at several nested levels in a river basin:
• At the river level, during dry seasons there may be insufficient flow to meet all demands and this gives way to negotiated rules for sharing between user groups (e.g., irrigation
canals using one river), and they are constantly redefined.
• Within an irrigation canal, users’ participation in maintenance may be instrumental in the definition of allocation
rules in case supply is unable to meet demand.
Locally-negotiated water rights are often sanctioned by the
authority vested in the decision-making body (e.g. river committees) and by the social recognition of these structures. Also
of importance is the fact that at the level of an irrigation canal,
water rights are often tied to labour investment in the hydraulic
property which enhances one’s claim to water access (Coward,
1986).
Water rights claims are often contested. As depicted in
Fig. 1, the struggle includes competition over who gets access
to water, infrastructure and material means (resources); contest
over the formulation and contents of water rights and operational norms (rules); struggle over decision-making authority
and the legitimacy of rights systems (regulatory control); and
the diverging discourses that defend or challenge particular
water policies, normative constructs and water hierarchies
(regimes of representation) (Boelens, 2008).
The 4 components are involved simultaneously and chained
together in particular ways, establishing how water is distributed, how humans and non-humans are ordered in socio-technical hierarchies, how this is legitimated by moral and symbolic
order, etc. (Boelens, 2008; Mehta, 2007). Such alignments take
place in ways that either strengthen or challenge the status quo.
In this way, water rights struggles are at the centre of power
relations. Power is used here to mean relational effects arising out of one’s location advantage, access to other material
resources and/or psychological strength (Piccione and Razin,
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Figure 1
The proposed
echelons of water
rights analysis
(Source: adapted
from Boelens, 2008)

2009). Power relations generate key features of water rights
content, distribution and legitimacy, and, in turn, water rights
in action reproduce or restructure power relations (Boelens,
2008). For instance, acts of resistance against a dominant actor
(e.g. attacks on estates intakes) may subvert power relations
between the actors and this in turns affect water control.
In sum, water rights stand at the centre of struggles over
legitimacy. Legitimacy describes the formal and informal ways
in which processes, policies, structures and agents are validated and consequently empowered (Gearey and Jeffrey, 2006).
The challenge is in equating legitimacy to legality. Legitimacy
has both a normative quality and a social dimension – it is not
only a reason for action but also the justification for action
(Bodansky, 2007; Gearey and Jeffrey, 2006). Bodansky (2007)
argues that legitimacy is a much broader concept than legality in at least 3 ways: (1) legality is one possible justification
of authority, but not the only criterion in assessing authority
of institutions (e.g., a certain use of water may be illegal yet
considered legitimate by some); (2) exercise of authority can
exist outside a legal system and still raise issues of legitimacy
(e.g. traditional leaders); and (3) legitimacy relates not simply
to compliance, but to the justification of authority more generally. He argues further that an institution may be considered
legitimate when users think that it serves their self-interest.
We use the above conceptualisation of water rights struggles to
explore the dynamic of water access and distribution between
large-scale irrigators and smallholder farmers in the Nduruma
sub-catchment.
The complex nature of accessing water can be aptly illustrated by the case of Nduruma River. In this catchment small
and large-scale irrigators mediate their differing perspectives
because they share one and the same source of water.

Research methods and case study
sub-catchment
Research methods
The objectives of this research were to describe and analyse
water-sharing agreements among and between various users
of the Nduruma River. We were particularly interested in how
each user’s unique situation affected water use and cooperation
with other users. Our consideration of situation included questions of: location (upstream or downstream); political influence;

size of demand and/or production; type of intake and/or irrigation technology employed; and whether the user was foreign or
local. To achieve these objectives, we first needed to identify
all users, their location, and intake points. To identify the users
and their networks, we followed the Nduruma River downstream, mapped the hydraulic infrastructures tapping the water
source (predominantly irrigation canals referred to here as
furrows), and followed them back to their owners.
Once each furrow was located and attributed to either a village or an estate, we conducted interviews with various stakeholders and irrigation committees. We started group interviews
with village furrow committees: 7 members, including the
village chairmen, each from Makasuro sub-village, Nduruma,
Moivaro and Madawe villages; and 14 members from Manyire
village. Discussions with these groups were conducted around a
similar set of questions to determine current norms in use, how
water is allocated to each furrow, and how this is transformed
into water access for individual members of a furrow. We also
investigated what the village leaders thought about how their
water use influenced downstream users, and how their supply
was affected by those upstream.
We also met with at least one representative from each of
the estates located in the mid-zone of the Nduruma River: the
owner of Old River Farm; the former owner of Gomba Estate;
the farm manager of Dekker Bruins; the director and irrigation
manager of Arusha Blooms; and the environmental and fertigation officers of Kiliflora. Questions asked of these individuals
were similar to those asked of the villagers, such as determining if their water supply met their demand and how they
affected and/or were affected by surrounding village users. In
addition, representatives were asked to describe their relationship with surrounding villagers and their strategies to secure
access to water.
Interviews were also conducted with officials from the local
governments and basin authority to get a broader understanding of the issue: the Meru District Irrigation Officer; the Water
Officer at the Pangani Basin Water Office; the Nduruma Ward
Executive Officer; and the Sokon II Ward Office Chairman. We
asked them to describe the current state of water sharing (or
conflict) and how state-issued water rights were influencing the
situation.
For those villages that had River Committees in place,
we met and conducted interviews with the committees’ head
members as well. We held discussions with the chairman and
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Figure 2
Nduruma sub-catchment, villages and irrigation
canal intakes
Table 1
Agro-ecological zones of Nduruma sub-catchment
Zone & wards

Elevation
(AMSL*)

Rainfall
(mm/yr)

Land use/dominant features

Forest reserve
Highland

Above 1 800 m
1 400-1 800 m

~ 1 400
~1 000

Midland

1 000-1 400 m

~500

Lowland

Below 800 m

~ 400

Forest reserve, wildlife, lumbering, mining. National park
Subsistence agriculture (major crops: coffee, bananas, sugarcane, yams, maize,
vegetables, and sweet potatoes). Supplemental irrigation practiced but changes
to full irrigation during dry seasons. Livestock are stalled – mainly dairy cattle.
Water used for domestic, irrigation, livestock and Arusha municipal supply
Referred to as “Plastic Valley,” the area is under intensive agriculture. Crops
include coffee, banana, maize, beans, horticultural crops and export flowers.
Originally white settlers’ coffee estates but now changing into larger commercial flower growers (majority international investors). Competition over water is
intense.
Subsistence agriculture and livestock. Receives low rainfall, highly affected by
upstream water use. Major crops: tobacco, rice, beans, maize, and vegetables.
Livestock are free-range, mainly own by pastoral Maasai.

secretary of the Nduruma and Manyire River Committees.
The committee members were asked to give their own perspective on the questions listed above. In addition, they were
asked general questions about the committee itself: why it was
formed and whose idea or initiative it was, how a furrow group
can become a member of the River Committee, the specific role
of this committee, especially with respect to water allocation,
its spatial span of control, management structure and election
of representatives and leaders, and its relationship with estates
and estate managers.
Nduruma River
The Nduruma River, located in the upper parts of the Pangani
River Basin, originates in a protected forest reserve near the
summit of Mount Meru and is fed by small tributaries (Songota
and Manyire being the main ones) and springs along its course
(Fig. 2). Rainfall is bimodal with short rains (vuli) from November
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to January and long rains (masika) falling from March to June.
Eight administrative wards of the Arumeru district depend
at least in part on the Nduruma River at some time in the
year: Bangata, Nkoanrua, Sokon II, Mlangarini, Nduruma,
Moshono, Kikwe, and Mbuguni. These wards can be divided
into 3 groups based roughly on altitude and composition of the
water users – highlands, midlands, and lowlands (Table 1).
The highlands begin below the forest reserve and end
just above the Arusha-Moshi highway. Irrigation has been
practiced for more than 200 years in the highland zone. The
villages in this zone are Midawe, Bangata, and Nkoanrua.
The western bank of the river is mainly occupied by Arusha
people and the eastern bank by the Meru people (Spear, 1997).
The main source of income for this area is the cultivation of
maize and bananas, coffee, pyrethrum and round potatoes.
The most upstream village of Midawe has several furrows that
in fact draw from springs and the river Songota, a tributary
of Nduruma. Off the Nduruma River itself, there are 4 main
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with the ‘plastic valley’, and thus there is a fair number of
large-scale irrigators here as well, clustered just below the
Old Arusha-Moshi road. The villages in this zone relying on
Nduruma water are Mlangarini, Manyire, Mzimuni, Marurani,
and Nduruma.

Water governance in Nduruma

Figure 3
Existing water use structures with and without state-issued water
rights in Nduruma River and their measured dry season water
abstractions, November 2003. (Source: PBWO archive)

Irrigation along the Nduruma River dates back more than 200
years (Spear, 1997), but intensive water use only started to pick
up pace during the colonial period, when white commercial
farmers settled in the area, and began using the same water
resources as the indigenous population. A map dating back to
1959 provides an illustration of the land use situation shortly
before independence. This map was obtained from Pamoja
archives and was made by ‘J.N.S.’ on 10 April 1959. Only the
initials of the author are indicated, and we suspect that the map
was made through a directive from the colonial administration
(see Spear, 1997). The majority of the furrows are in the highlands, and are labelled ‘African.’ Below them, in the midland,
there are fewer, but longer furrows, the majority of which
are labelled ‘European.’ Below these (lowland), only a small
number of short furrows can be seen, which are once again
labelled ‘African.’ The situation is not much different today;
the present geography is such that smallholder farmers are
located upstream and downstream while the midstream zone is
mainly occupied by large-scale irrigators growing flowers for
European markets. This spatial geography shapes the nature
of water governance in the catchment. This section briefly
describes, first, the state-sanctioned water right governance
system in Nduruma River; second, the local water governance
arrangements; and third, the functioning of the locally-developed Nduruma River Committee.
State-sanctioned water right governance in Nduruma

furrows. Due to the large population, there is a large shortage
of land in this zone, and this leads to degradation of the water
sources and river banks, as people are forced to farm any available land.
The midland zone is roughly defined by the current
Arusha-Moshi highway and the Old Arusha -Moshi dirt road.
It overlaps with the area that locals call the ‘plastic-valley’
because of the huge number of (plastic-roofed) greenhouses,
belonging to commercial farmers, which dot the landscape.
Formerly, the area was used for coffee production and formed
what Spear (1997) called the ‘iron ring of land alienation’
around the base of Mount Meru. The coffee estates around
Mount Meru were not nationalised by the independent government of Tanzania (Baffes, 2003; Spear, 1997). These estates
are foreign-owned and depend on Nduruma River for intensive
irrigation to grow flowers and vegetable seeds needed for the
international market. Smallholder farmers are the minority in
the midlands, both in terms of their number and their landholdings. Manyire tributary originates from this zone and is being
used by the estates and surrounding villages.
The lowland zone of the Nduruma valley is semi-arid.
Until recently, the area was used for commercial sisal production and livestock grazing. Currently, the main economic
activities include livestock keeping and subsistence agriculture.
The majority of users are smallholder farmers who predominantly grow maize, beans, rice, tomatoes, vegetables and
fruits. Some of the villages farthest downstream have been
recently populated by people moving from different parts of the
country. The most upstream portion of this zone also overlaps

The German and British colonisers first introduced statutory
water law in what is now mainland Tanzania in the early 20th
century; all water was declared a state resource and the water
right permit system was introduced (Lein and Tagseth, 2009;
Maganga, 2003). The water rights system was particularly
introduced to curtail natives’ water use and secure water for
white commercial settlers who had interest in agricultural
intensification in the highlands (see Komakech et al., 2011). In
the Nduruma sub-catchment, local farmers were dispossessed
of their lands and water resources (Spear, 1997). Subsequent
amendments have since been made to the Water Utilization
(Control and Regulation) Act in 1948, 1959, 1974, 1981, 1996,
1997 and 2009. A volumetric water use fee was first introduced
in the 1974 Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act.
The Tanzanian government recently reformed its water sector:
in 2002 a new National Water Policy was put in place (United
Republic of Tanzania, 2002). Under this policy, water belongs
to the state, and all water users with an intention to abstract
surface or underground water must acquire water rights from
a designated basin water authority (basin water board/office).
However, with the exception of volumetric water use fees, the
current water rights system is still similar in many aspects to
the colonial water law. A basin water board may grant or refuse
water rights to any person or groups. If granted, the water
right specifies the purpose, volumetric amount allowed, duration of the right, and the source (United Republic of Tanzania,
2009). A permit holder may, with the consent of the basin water
board, temporarily lease his/her use right to anyone, and for
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any duration, provided that the duration of the permit is not
exceeded. Nothing in any water use permit granted implies
any guarantee that the quality and quantity of water referred to
is, or shall be, available. Permits may be declared by the basin
board as appurtenant to land described in the permit. However,
state-issued water rights seem to lead to over-abstraction in
many places. In the Rufiji basin, for example, issuing water
rights led to over-abstraction and increased competition as
users argued that acquiring a state water right is synonymous
with owning the water (see Van Koppen et al., 2007). The problem is that ‘water rights’ was translated to Swahili as haki za
kumiliki maji (water property rights) – which made users think
that acquiring a permit conferred full ownership rights. The
government tried to address this problem with the new Water
Act (Control and Regulation 2009) by redefining the phrase
‘water use permit’, using the Swahili haki ya kutumia maji
(right to use water). In addition current water use permits are
issued to users specifying a fixed flow rate, determined based
on the assumption that an average supply exists (Lankford and
Beale, 2007; Van Koppen et al., 2007). However, in the Pangani
and other basins in Tanzania rainfall and hence water supply is
highly variable, which makes the state allocation inappropriate,
especially during low flows (dry seasons or during droughts).
The Pangani Basin Water Board (PBWO), through its executive basin office, is responsible for allocating all water rights
in the basin of which Nduruma is a sub-catchment. PBWO
maintains a database of all users in the basin and handles all
new requests. Most of the large-scale irrigators along Nduruma
acquired their water rights during the colonial time, but these
were revised by PBWO in 2003 to accommodate Arusha City’s
water demand (Komakech et al., 2010). Figure 3 is a sketch of
water right status and measured dry season abstractions along
Nduruma River.
Through their system of indirect rule, the British also created the conditions for a pluralist system of water governance
in Tanzania (Spear, 1997). They created Crown Land to be
governed by statutory law and Native Reserves (land occupied
by the Africans) to be governed by local law. Ever since the
colonial time, customary rights in the Pangani River Basin
have coevolved with statutory water rights.
Local water governance in Nduruma sub-catchment
The furrows in the highlands each have a committee, composed of a chairman, secretary, and members. For most of the
furrow committees there is also a ‘council’ of elders who act as
advisors. The committees are mostly concerned with organising the youth of the community into a maintenance schedule
for the infrastructure. The furrow committees generally meet
every 3 months and elections for membership are held every 4
years, at the annual village committee meetings. In the dry season, when water is scarcer, there is a need to precisely allocate
the water amongst the various farmers (via a rotational system).
Most of the highland furrows drawing from the main stem of
the Nduruma River have metal intake gates, but furrows drawing from springs and Songota tributary have no lockable gates.
However, all metal gates were found locked in the fully opened
position, or intentionally destroyed in order to abstract more
water, a sign that they are not used to regulate water allocation.
All highland furrows abstract water simultaneously with no
turn-taking enforced even during the dry season.
Highland furrow committees claimed that there is no conflict amongst the villages themselves. Although some downstream villages use these same furrows the highland furrow
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committees never organise meetings with them. Nkoanrua’s
furrow chairman explained that the reason why they have never
met with downstream users such as Moivaro Village is because
these villages tap springs which ensure domestic water supply. Because of this domestic supply, downstream villagers are
believed to receive enough water to survive. The highlanders
do not seem to bother whether or not the downstream villagers
receive enough water to produce sufficient food and maintain
their livelihoods.
In the midland area, only furrows used by smallholder
farmers have committees with structures similar to those of
the highlands. Large-scale irrigators do not use committees
to manage their furrows. During the rainy season, farmers in
Moivaro, for instance, claim that they don’t irrigate so they
only use intra-village allocation schedules in the dry season. In
May and June, the furrow committee is in charge of repairing
the furrows that were damaged, in preparation for the coming
dry season. The furrows are typically silted up during the rains
and the intakes get damaged. There is an annual fee of around
2 000 to 3 000 Tsh (1.34 - 2.00 USD) collected from each plot
(shamba) in the village for completing the furrow repairs.
Lowland furrows have committees with the following
composition: 3 water distributors, 3 advisors, 2 water guards,
a chairman, treasurer, and secretary. These committees are
responsible for water allocation to individual farmers, routine
maintenance, and resolving resource conflict. The chairman,
secretary, and advisors determine the day-to-day water allocation schedule. Individuals are assigned water for approximately
2 hours each. Despite this planning, villagers still steal water
along the way. There is a 5 000 Tsh (3.34 USD) fine for water
theft, which is handled within the village government system.
Local catchment wide governance structure:
Nduruma River Committee
There is no overall water management institution for the
Nduruma sub-catchment that is recognised by the Pangani
Basin Water Board. This notwithstanding, the allocation
of water between the midlands (mainly large-scale farmers) and lowlands is being managed by the Nduruma River
Committee. The villages that actively participate in the
River Committee are Mlangarini, Manyire, Mzimuni,
Marurani, and Nduruma. According to the current Board
Chairman, in the past there was sufficient water, but during
droughts or dry seasons, elders would meet and agree on
allocation schedules. There was one elder whose role was
to guard the river. He would follow the river upstream and
negotiate with upstream farmers. Between 1962 and 1974,
an extreme drought occurred and the idea of the committee emerged. Leaders of the individual furrows would meet
after examining the levels of available water in the Nduruma
River and then agree on allocation schedules. However,
the discussion of allocation schedules in ‘traditional’ times
never travelled beyond Ambureni/Moivaro Village to the
highlands. The Nduruma River Committee in its current
structure was initiated in 1999 by smallholder and large
commercial farmers with the support of the Arumeru
District Commissioner. This is also the year when the first
formal elections occurred for the chairman and secretary.
Currently, every furrow in the mid- and lowlands is represented on the Nduruma River Committee, normally by the
chairman and secretary of the furrow. Within each furrow
there is an election every 3 years for these positions. If there
is a problem, new members are selected to replace old ones.
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Among these representatives, a chairman and a secretary of
the Board are elected. In addition, the security guards from
each of the furrows attend the Board meetings, but do not vote.
Representatives from each of the estates attend committee
meetings as well – normally the estate farm managers or irrigation officers, who are always native Tanzanians. The current
chairman of the River Committee is from Mlangarini Village
and the secretary from Nduruma Village.
The Nduruma River Committee is responsible for setting
the allocation schedules for each of the main villages as well
as commercial estate furrows. If it is discovered that a furrow/
estate is violating the agreement and abstracting outside of its
allowed time, the Board levies a fine on the responsible party.
In the case of the estates, the fine is levied in the name of the
estate representative to the Board, usually the irrigation manager. Stephen Gregory from Tanzania Flowers explained that
in his case the estate would cover the penalty. In the case of the
village furrows, the fine is levied against the furrow chairman
regardless of who made the irrigation offence.
Under local water-use bylaws, the punishment for stealing
water was to supply a sheep or goat to be eaten by the clan.
Since 1999 the fine has been levied in Tanzania shillings. The
fine for estates was raised in January 2009 from 100 000 Tsh to
200 000 Tsh (67-134 USD). The fine for village farmers caught
stealing is variable and usually a much smaller sum. This punishment is often relegated to the individual furrow committee
to manage. In theory, if a villager is unable to pay his fine he is
expected to forfeit a section of his land, but in practice this has
never occurred.
There are no registration or membership fees for being a
part of the River Committee. Most of the large estates make
voluntary payments when asked. These cash allotments go
toward small purchases such as refreshments for meetings. The
River Committee has no bank account and thus no mechanism
for storing large amounts of money. Nelson, from Dekker Bruin
expressed his frustration concerning this matter: ‘Sometimes
[the estates] are sent a request for funds, or someone asks for
[help with] transport to the [meetings]. The Board should really
have an account. There are silly problems like sometimes
the chairman fails to phone because he has run out of credit.’
Because the requests for financial support are informal and
sporadic, estates have no way of knowing if they are sharing
the financial burden. It is apparent that Tanzania Flowers and
Dekker Bruins have borne the brunt of the costs. The Nduruma
River Committee has no headquarters or office and meetings
are generally held in an open field on the property of Dekker
Bruins.
Finally, Manyire villagers claim that they have a River
Committee for Manyire river. The committee reportedly was
elected in the year 2000 during a general assembly attended by
the villages of Manyire, Maji moto, Karangai and Makasoru.
Apparently Nambala and Kikwe village were not part of the
meeting. Nambala village is in conflict with the other villages
and does not recognise Manyire River Committee.

Legitimacy and struggles over water access and
control
The situation in Nduruma is challenging for the large-scale irrigators who want to invest in an environment where the state’s
water law is deemed legal and legitimate at all levels. All largescale irrigators in the sub-catchment have state-issued water
rights (also referred to as ‘official’ water rights). Although some
smallholder groups have also acquired state water rights on

their irrigation canals, the allocation of water ‘on the ground’
is being done according to local rules. This leads to struggles
between the smallholder farmers, who appeal to customary
principles and the large-scale irrigators, who want to adhere to
the state’s statutory water law. In addition to the struggle over
water access and control, the large-scale irrigators also invest
in water-related infrastructure to secure access to water. The
technological innovations include the use of a ‘high-tech’ drip
irrigation system, rainwater harvesting from the greenhouse
roofs, storage infrastructure and boreholes. We present in this
section 3 cases of conflict and cooperation between the estates
and smallholder farmers: first, Gomba Estate that claims that
only the official legal right is legitimate; second, Enza Zaden
that attempts to mediate conflict between Manyire users; and
third, a group of estates that agrees on rotational allocation
with smallholder farmers.
Contested official water law: case of Gomba estate
One notorious example of conflict between the Nduruma River
Committee and a foreign-owned commercial farm is the case of
Gomba Estate. In 1996, a Canadian investor took over a failed
coffee estate in the midlands. The old coffee estate had
2 permanent water rights attached to the land: one water
right is from Nduruma River (issued for Lambi 2 Furrow)
and another from nearby Manyire River (issued for Lambi
1 Furrow). Lambi 2 was already being used by the village
of Manyire. Gomba Estate embarked upon a large operation
to grow a diversity of crops – mainly vegetables and fruit
trees. The downstream villages of Manyire, Nduruma, and
Mlangarini immediately noticed the decrease in dry-season
water supply when the farm became operational.
On behalf of the downstream villagers, the Nduruma River
Committee attempted to meet with the Canadian to negotiate
a water-rationing schedule. According to the village leaders of
Manyire and Nduruma, ‘He wouldn’t attend any of the meetings to discuss water allocation. We tried to levy fines on him
for taking water at the wrong time but he refused to pay and
wouldn’t let us in at the gate [of the estate].’ The Canadian’s
reason for refusing to negotiate with the Nduruma Board was
that he felt he had an ‘official’ legal right to the amount he had
been allocated by Pangani Basin Water Board/Office (PBWO)
and for which he paid an annual fee. He also felt uncomfortable
establishing agreements with an unofficial organisation when
it concerned the success of his estate. Explains the Canadian,
‘What you end up with are guards with machetes watching
your water intake to make sure you don’t open it too early. No
one knows what is official or not. Inside the villages the villagers themselves steal the water – it is impossible to negotiate
with that many people at once.’
For support of his claim, the Canadian called the District
Commissioner and cited his official water right. In his words,
‘All I would ask was, “Please apply the law.”’ Village leaders
from Nduruma interpreted this behaviour as disrespectful and
unaccommodating. The Canadian refused to solve anything
without first calling the area Ward Councillor (Diwani). In the
words of the village chairman of Nduruma, ‘The Canadian
only knows 3 people: the area member of Parliament, the
President, and the Minister of Investment. He was very rude;
he wouldn’t attend the River Committee meetings.’ In response
to the Canadian’s refusal to negotiate, many of the villagers
responded with violence. Gomba’s furrow intakes were vandalised and its irrigation workers were harassed. According to
the Canadian, these were common occurrences during the dry
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season, ‘There were literally mobs of people with machetes at
the intake from June to the end of February the following year.’
Gomba Estate stopped operation in 2007. The land of the estate
now lies abandoned, but Manyire village regained control of
Lambi 2 Furrow.
Mediating local conflict: Enza Zaden’s role in Manyire
water conflict
Enza Zaden is a Dutch-owned vegetable-seed breeding estate
located along the Old Arusha-Moshi Road. In 2005, the company bought 45 acres of land that was once a coffee plantation
known as Sarkos’s Farm. Although the estate has water rights
to use both the Nduruma and Manyire Rivers, it doesn’t take
any water from them because in the dry season there is not sufficient water. Instead, the main supply comes from a borehole
near Lake Duluti, 1 km upstream of the estate. This borehole
has been registered with PBWO, for which the estate pays an
annual fee. The estate has also drilled a second borehole for
reasons of water security and claims to be in the process of
registering it with PBWO. Enza employs 140 people on a permanent basis with an additional 40 temporarily hired to assist
with the ongoing constructions on the farm. Almost all of these
employees come from the downstream villages of Manyire and
Nambala.
In early 2001 Nambala Village dug a new furrow from the
Manyire River across the land now owned by Enza Zaden. At
the time there was no agricultural activity taking place on this
land. The furrow is called SANAKIMA, an acronym derived
from the names of its users: Sarkos’s Farm, Nambala Village,
Kikwe Village, and Maweni Village. Representatives from
Nambala explained that this furrow was necessary because their
main water source, the Ganana River, had dried up from overuse
upstream. Nambala and Kikwe also claim to have been drawing
water from Manyire River since 1978, at which time there were
unofficial user agreements between the various village heads.
Downstream of Enza’s estate and the SANAKIMA intake
are the villages of Manyire, Karangai, and Maji Moto, with
a total of 16 furrows which use the Manyire River as their
source. The 7 furrows that support Manyire Village are:
Majengo Juu, Majengo Kati, Mshikamano, King’ori, Kusini
A, Kusini B, Levorosi, and Upendo. According to the chairman of the Manyire River Committee, representatives of
the Board complained to PBWO about the construction of
SANAKIMA furrow. He claims that PBWO, which does
officially recognise the aforementioned 7 furrows, ordered
the closing of SANAKIMA. Meanwhile, Nambala’s village
committee claims that they are in the process of registering
for an official water right with PBWO. A tenuous sharing
agreement was agreed between the 2 parties concerning the
times of opening and closing of the SANAKIMA furrow.
However, there continued to be many disagreements between
the members of the villagers – each side of the argument
sent a full-time watchman to guard the furrow intake point
on Enza Zaden’s property. On several occasions there were
violent interactions involving machetes when one village
accused another of either opening or closing the furrow at
inappropriate times. The intake of SANAKIMA furrow was
not fitted with cement lining or a control gate. This meant
that water flow was controlled by the infilling of stones and
soil excavated from the riverbank and from the nearby Enza
Zaden farmland – a routine activity that contributed to the
degradation of the source and the slow erosion of parts of
Enza Zaden’s land.
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The managers of Enza Zaden became increasingly frustrated with the conflict situation. In addition to the harm being
done to their land by trespassing villagers, the noise from the
occasional brawl would wake up the manager and his family
whose house is located near to the furrow intake. The manager
of Enza Zaden met with representatives from each side and proposed that the intake point itself be moved farther downstream,
away from the estate house. In addition, Enza Zaden proposed
to fund the construction of an intake weir. A second meeting
was held with water representatives from Manyire, Nambala,
Kikwe, and Maweni in attendance. The estate’s production
manager facilitated the meeting. The previously agreed upon
irrigation schedule was modified, put into a written contract,
and signed on an Enza Zaden official letterhead. While prior
to the agreement Nambala, Kikwe, and Maweni received
water from 2 am to 3 pm, the current (dry season) schedule has
reduced their allocation to the period between 6 am and 3 pm.
On the part of Enza Zaden, the company agreed to finance the
construction of a permanent intake structure.
According to Enza Zaden’s seed-cleaning manager, the
villagers have so far stuck to the agreed furrow schedule; there
have been no recent violent disputes over accusations of ‘intake
gate’ tampering. Throughout this process Enza Zaden made no
attempt to contact any level of the local government or PBWO,
though both Manyire and Nambala claimed to have requested
intervention of the district commissioner without response.
When asked what the purpose of signing the contract was, both
parties replied similarly. The villagers think that it affords them
some ‘evidence of agreement’ against the other, though a local
court is unlikely to consider this informal document binding. A member of the Manyire River Committee and resident
of Manyire Village, claims that during a particularly heated
encounter with Nambala furrow guards, he threatened to go
to the police ‘with the signed document in hand.’ In response
to this threat the men backed down. Villagers of Nambala,
when asked for comment on the above anecdote explained that
they understood that the document offered no real power of
enforcement, ‘just the power of everyone signing.’ In return for
its mediation role, Enza Zaden is treated like a relative by the
villagers and many downstream farmers feel comfortable with
the estate.
Negotiated allocation: Estates’ agreeing with the
local River Committee
During the rainy season (March to May and November to
December) the villagers only use furrows for supplemental
irrigation, but they engage in full-scale irrigation during the
dry season. The estates are able to meet their full irrigation
demands during rainy seasons and high flows. However, during the dry seasons, the Nduruma River Committee demands
that all estates must reduce the time of their abstraction and
the duration is negotiated every month. Most of the estates are
active participants in the negotiation process and have representatives who attend every meeting. These estates include
Arusha Blooms, Kiliflora, Tanzania Flowers, Dekker Bruins
and Old River estates. The estates often contribute small
amounts of financial support for drinks and transportation of
members of the River Committees. Dekker Bruins particularly
has invested in a strong relationship with the River Committee:
all monthly meetings are held on the property of the estate and
for each meeting Dekker provides refreshments for the participants. The estate’s farm manager attributes this support to a
necessity of cooperation. At the start of our research
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(January 2009), the arrangement stipulated that the estates and
the village of Mlangarini abstracted water from 6 am to
4 pm. At 4 pm their gates are closed and the water is allowed
to flow downstream into the open furrows of Nduruma Village
and the other users below the Maruroi furrow. This rotational
agreement was revised in February 2009 and estates’ schedule
was from 5 am to 1 pm. To enforce this, the River Committee
employs a water guard who patrols along the river, checking
each and every intake of the large-scale irrigators. According
to the Director of Arusha Blooms, the agreement with the River
Committee during the dry season means that they don’t get
enough water and the estates are forced to skip some irrigation
schedules, which translate to an estimated 10% loss in production. She stated that, over time, the problem is not water volume
per se, but the lack of storage facility at the estate to maintain
production during the dry season. The estates also negotiate
between themselves. Arusha Blooms reported that they often
send their representative (a Tanzanian national) to request
additional time from the other estates and at times from the
River Committee. The estate managers typically prefer to settle
water concerns in this informal fashion without resorting to
any outside authority (e.g., PBWO). Estates see their cooperative agreement with the downstream smallholder farmers as an
act of good neighbourliness, although they also admit to trying
to address complaints that could tarnish the companies’ image
internationally. The manager of Dekker Bruins stated explicitly
during our interview, that to acquire a certification from The
Netherlands they must be seen as working with the local communities. The manager of Tanzania Flowers stated that because
one of its farms is located on the boundary between the largescale irrigators and downstream smallholder farmers, they
find themselves much more involved in the River Committee’s
activities, while the other estates further upstream interact very
little with the Board. The estates argue that their participation
is an attempt to make downstream users understand that water
use by the estate also generates benefits for the community
downstream (e.g., employment opportunity, as well as schools
and dispensaries constructed through their social responsibility
projects).
However, the agreement is not without controversy. Some
of the estates do not strictly abide by the River Committee’s
decision on water allocation, and Kiliflora is one such estate.
Kiliflora uses an electric pump to convey water directly from
the river to its reservoirs instead of employing the traditional
gravity-facilitated furrow method. Unlike the other foreignowned estates of similar size, Kiliflora irrigates using the
relatively inefficient method of trough irrigation instead of
drip. A trough is a U-shaped channel used to supply water and/
or nutrient solutions to potted plants. According to the estate’s
fertigation officer, they run 2 pumps simultaneously, 6-8 hours
a day, 7 days a week, between 5 am and 1 pm. There are also
2 reservoirs located on the farms with storage capacities of
65 000 m3 and 3 000 m3. Also in this case the Nduruma River
Committee determines the hours when Kiliflora is allowed to
operate its pumps – during the dry season of January 2009 its
allocation had just been reduced by an hour. Kiliflora’s pumps
are a matter of concern amongst the member of the River
Committee and the downstream villagers whom they represent.
In the fertigation officer’s words, ‘We spent most of the last
meeting negotiating over when we could operate our pumps.
People from the village don’t understand that we have a right
to take this water.’ Representatives of the Board reported that
Kiliflora often runs its pumps outside of its permitted time window and the irrigation managers of Arusha Blooms and Dekker

Bruins corroborated this fact. However, the fertigation officer
denies that Kiliflora has ever gone against the prescriptions
of the Board. The fertigation officer however admitted that
Kiliflora withdraws more water than its PBWO-granted water
right allows. ‘Sometimes we take more and sometimes we
take less, in the dry season we take more than the water right
grants.’ He justifies this trespass by explaining, ‘We do struggle
with water…we struggle to maintain production during the dry
season.’ The efficacy of the Nduruma River Committee was
reportedly tested when the water guards found Kiliflora operating its water pump at unsanctioned hours. Kiliflora, like all
large-scale irrigators in the area, is surrounded by a high fence
and employs a security guard at its gates. When the Board officials appeared at the estate to address this issue and collect the
penalty, they weren’t allowed in or granted an audience with
the Kiliflora manager. Several letters explaining the infraction
were ignored. The fertigation officer did not acknowledge that
these events took place and insisted that his company follows
the mandates of the Board.
It seems that, in general, the estates that participate in
the Nduruma River Committee think that the organisation is
necessary for the region and are satisfied with its operation.
The irrigation managers acknowledge that in the dry season
water in the Nduruma River is insufficient to meet all demands.
Dekker Bruins’ representative explains that it is much better to
have a venue for people to discuss their needs and complaints
than to resort to violence:
‘There are more than 1 000 people downstream that need
this same water. We cannot fight with them. In the past
there was no discussion – machetes were always brought
out whenever there were problems, but now the downstream villages are trying to organise.’
A common complaint voiced by several of the large-scale
irrigators is that there is a lack of continuous Board activity
throughout the whole year. They feel that the Board is too concerned with matters of allocation and not concerned enough by
longer-term issues, such as source maintenance.

Discussion
The Nduruma case illustrates the fact that sources of water
rights are diverse, complex and often conflicting. It also highlights the issue that water rights do not arise solely from state
laws, agencies and courts, but also from local institutions and
views of other resource users. In Nduruma the question of
legitimacy is at the centre of the water rights struggle. Water
rights struggles in Nduruma conform to the 4 components of
the water right analysis as proposed by Boelens (2008), but in
a complex way. In this section we explore the dynamic of the
Nduruma water right struggles. The order is for presentation
only as the 4 components are involved simultaneously.
First, the competition over possession and use of resources
in the sub-catchment dates back to colonial times. As described
by Spear (1997), land ownership was a heavily contested
matter by local Meru communities, colonial administration
and European settlers throughout colonial times. The German
and British colonists alienated land around the base of Mount
Meru. The land and labour control struggle was only brought
to a close when the Meru people protested and appealed to the
United Nations against British seizure of more land (see Spear,
1997). The induced land inequities however still shape presentday struggles over who gets access to water; the competition is
at its most intense between the large-scale irrigators (midland)
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and the downstream smallholder farmers. In their midland
position, the estates are sandwiched between smallholders
farmers who are located both upstream and downstream of the
sub-catchment. Hence, the estates are both advantaged and
disadvantaged in terms of hydraulic location.
At the second level is the contest over the content of water
rights and its enforcement. Large-scale irrigators have location advantage over the downstream farmers, and from their
international origin, they also have better access to other
resources (e.g., knowledge, better irrigation technology and
financial means). Estates also benefit from a close connection
with a national government which is interested in encouraging
foreign investment. The estates also claim water access based
on state-issued water rights, which are labelled ‘official’ and
therefore legitimate. Hence, in their midstream location, the
estates may be considered more powerful. The estates’ water
allocation, especially during dry seasons, does not go unchallenged by the downstream smallholder farmers. These farmers
demanded that allocation should be rotational and take into
account supply variability and not absolute values specified
in the government water right. Most estates in the midstream
engage in negotiations with the smallholder farmers and tend to
agree on a time-based allocation during scarcity even when this
implies loss of production.
This research found that the most successful large-scale
irrigators are those able to engage with local systems of
negotiation and rotational water allocations. By adopting this
strategy, the estates not only avoid conflict with the local farmers, but also gain social reputation in the area, increasing the
chance of cooperation from the farmers towards their hydraulic
infrastructure investments. The main reasons for negotiation,
according to their representatives, are that it is:
• much better to have a venue for people to discuss and complain than to resort to violence;
• a matter of water security; and
• an organised front that can forcefully represent their
interest at a larger scale (catchment-wide or to the Pangani
Basin Water Office).
Their cooperation seems to fit the argument that the larger
one’s stake, the larger one’s interest in the common good and
thus the more responsibly one may act (Van der Zaag, 2007).
Violent response by the smallholder farmers on estates’ water
infrastructure is sufficient incentive for the estates to cooperate
and broker cooperative and equitable deals. This is illustrated
by the case of Enza Zaden Estate stepping in to mediate water
conflict between 2 villages. In return for its help, it gains
respect of the villages. Gomba Estate, by contrast, provides a
situation where non-cooperative behaviour led to self-destruction in the long run, as the estate was forced out of business
with lack of water being a major factor.
At the third level, regulatory control, the paper has shown
that this power is largely exercised by the Nduruma River
Committee, which claims to have legitimate decision-making
authority and takes responsibility for allocating water between
midland and lowland farmers. This cooperative arrangement
seems to only work well between close neighbours; at larger
spatial distance it is less effective. The major weakness of
the Nduruma River Committee is that its membership only
encompasses large-scale irrigators and the downstream users.
The Board is simply managing water the upstream villages
were unable to use. Since highland farmers do not have river
committees, it is difficult for the Nduruma River Committee to
engage with them.
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The fourth level, dealing with regime of representation is
best described by the water management perspectives of the
different levels of government. The national government is
interested in enforcing statutory water policies, laws and hierarchies, as well as promoting foreign commercial investment.
However, the local district administrations are more likely to
spend their limited resources ‘keeping the peace’, rather than
enforcing the letter of the water law. Estates that refuse to
cooperate with smallholder farmers are often told by district
administrators to go back and negotiate with their neighbours.

Conclusions
This paper has described how water access is negotiated
between smallholder irrigators and large-scale irrigators sharing the water of Nduruma River, Upper Pangani River Basin,
Tanzania. The spatial geography of Nduruma is such that
smallholder farmers are located upstream and downstream,
while large-scale irrigators are in the midstream part of the
sub-catchment. There is not enough water in the river to satisfy
all demands. The majority of the smallholder farmers currently
access water under local arrangements, while large-scale irrigators have obtained state-issued water use permits.
Although in such a context one would expect the weaker
downstream farmers to lose out, instead cooperation prevails.
Smallholder farmers in the sub-catchment counter inequities
in land and water distribution by enforcing suitable allocation
proxies (proportional division, time-based turns) which make
water rights more meaningful. Powerful estates that do not
agree to the terms of the local agreements find it difficult to
keep on operating, as their water infrastructure may be vandalised by smallholder irrigators. In addition, local government
officials pay little attention to the pleas by estates, thereby leaving the smallholder farmers with sufficient autonomy (see also:
Schlager and Ostrom, 1992).
The case study shows that a River Committee, an institution that was locally established and engineered and that is
not formally recognised in statute law in Tanzania, has been
conducive in structuring water allocation in a manner that has
been effective and that has forestalled major conflicts. The
institutional form of a River Committee has thus bridged local
rules and statute law with respect to water.
We find the most successful estates are those able to cooperate with the smallholder farmers. The risk of the estates to
lose a lot is here sufficient incentive for them to cooperate and
broker cooperative and equitable deals with their less powerful
counterparts (cf. Baland and Platteau, 1999). In such a situation
it becomes less easy for the many small water users to defect.
But cooperative behaviour by the estates may also be due to
other interdependencies between them and the smallholder
farmers. Large-scale irrigators have to engage with their downstream villages because of their dependence on local labour. In
addition, cooperation with smallholder farmers helps reinforce
the water claim of the estates at larger spatial scales. However,
this case study also shows that at the larger catchment scale it
has so far been impossible to institute and maintain effective
cooperative arrangements, despite the formally established
structures.
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